【雙語(yǔ)閱讀】社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)馴服欺騙者.

　　為幫助廣大考生更好地準(zhǔn)備雅思、托福、SAT等考試，澳際留學(xué)特推出【英語(yǔ)學(xué)習(xí)】頻道，涵蓋基礎(chǔ)英語(yǔ)、實(shí)用英語(yǔ)、娛樂(lè)英語(yǔ)等多項(xiàng)內(nèi)容，在您通往成功的道路上做您最堅(jiān)實(shí)的左膀右臂。

　　以下部分為【雙語(yǔ)閱讀】?jī)?nèi)容，本文介紹社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)馴服欺騙者，中文翻譯部分見(jiàn)第二頁(yè)。

　　Science and Technolgy

　　The evolution of co-operation

　　Make or break?

　　Social networking tames cheats

　　HOW people collaborate, in the face of numerous temptations to cheat, is an important field of psychological and economic research. A lot of this research focuses on the "tit-for-tat" theory of co-operation: that humans are disposed, when dealing with another person, to behave in a generous manner until that other person shows himself not to be generous. At this point co-operation is withdrawn. Fool me once, in other words, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. When he encounters such a withdrawal of collaboration, the theory goes, the malactor will learn the error of his ways and become a more co-operative individual.

　　And there is experimental evidence, based on specially designed games, that tit-for-tat does work for pairs of people. Human societies, though, are more complex than mere dyads. And until recently, it has been difficult to model that complexity in the laboratory. But a paper published this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by Nicholas Christakis and his colleagues at Harvard has changed that. Dr Christakis arranged for a collaboration-testing game to be played over the web, with many participants. As a result, he and his team have gained a more sophisticated insight into the way co-operation develops.

　　Dr Christakis used what is known as a public-goods game for his experiment. At the beginning of such a game, points are doled out to each participant. During every round, players are given the opportunity to donate points to their neighbours. Points so donated are augmented by an equal number from the masters of the game. If everyone co-operates, then, everyone ends up richer. A "dector" who ruses to donate to his co-operating neighbours will, however, benit at the expense of those neighbours. At the game&aposs end, the points are converted into real money, to ensure that proper incentives are in place.

　　To play his large-scale public-goods game, Dr Christakis recruited 785 volunteers via Mechanical Turk—a service provided by Amazon, an online retailer, that works by farming out small tasks to an army of individual workers. Each volunteer was randomly assigned links to, on average, eight other players. Together, they played repeated rounds of one of three variations of the game. In the first, participants always interacted with the same group of people. In the second, the connections were randomly reshuffled after each round. In the final version, one-third of the possible pairings between participants were chosen at random after each round (such pairs may or may not, therore, have been dealing with each other in the previous round). One player from each pair was first told or reminded of how the other had behaved in the previous round, and was then asked whether he wanted to break his connection with that player, if he already had one, or form a new connection, if he had not.

　　In all versions of the game, roughly 60% of players started out co-operating. However, in the first two, this decreased over time as the pernicious influence of the freeloaders spread. The larger the fraction of a subject&aposs partners who dected in a given round, the less likely that person was to co-operate in the next—classical tit-for-tat. However, this tit-for-tat retaliation was not enough to save co-operation, and after a dozen rounds only 10-20% of the players were still willing to co-operate. In the variant where participants had some choice over whom they interacted with, though, the amount of co-operation stayed stable as the rounds progressed.

　　When Dr Christakis and his team looked at how the relationships between players were evolving in this third version, they found that connections between two co-operators were much more likely to be maintained than links that involved a dector. Over time, the co-operators accumulated more social connections than the dectors did. Furthermore, as they were shunned, the dectors began to change their behaviour. A dector&aposs likelihood of switching to co-operation increased with the number of players who had broken links with him in the previous round. Unlike straightforward tit-for-tat, social retaliation was having a marked fect.

　　The next question, then, is whether such a mechanism holds outside the laboratory. To find out, Dr Christakis has forged links with some anthropologists. They hope to report the answer soon.

　　【中文對(duì)照翻譯】

　　科技

　　合作關(guān)系的演變

　　建立還是終止?

　　社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)馴服欺騙者

　　在無(wú)數(shù)互相欺騙的誘惑中，人們?nèi)绾谓⒑献麝P(guān)系?這是心理和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究的一個(gè)很重要的領(lǐng)域。 關(guān)于這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的很多研究都集中在"以牙還牙"的合作理論： 那就是，一個(gè)人在處理和另外一個(gè)人的關(guān)系時(shí)，開(kāi)始都會(huì)選擇慷慨的態(tài)度，直到對(duì)方顯露出不慷慨的跡象， 這個(gè)時(shí)候也是合作關(guān)系終止的時(shí)候。 用另外一種話(huà)說(shuō)，就是"欺我一回，罪過(guò)在你， 欺我二回，罪過(guò)在我。" 當(dāng)遭遇這樣的一次合作終止，如理論所說(shuō)，作為合作規(guī)則的破壞者，他會(huì)開(kāi)始反省他處事的過(guò)錯(cuò)，并且開(kāi)始變成更加樂(lè)于合作的個(gè)體。

　　在特殊設(shè)計(jì)的游戲基礎(chǔ)上得出的實(shí)驗(yàn)證據(jù)顯示，"以牙還牙"理論在兩個(gè)人的關(guān)系中確實(shí)奏效。 然而人類(lèi)社會(huì)關(guān)系遠(yuǎn)比兩兩之間更為復(fù)雜。 直到最近，這種復(fù)雜的關(guān)系還難以在實(shí)驗(yàn)室中模擬出來(lái)。 但在這周，哈佛大學(xué)Nicholas Christakis和他的同事在"國(guó)家科學(xué)院院刊"上發(fā)表的論文改變了這個(gè)狀況。 Christakis博士在網(wǎng)上安排了一場(chǎng)多人參與的實(shí)驗(yàn)測(cè)試游戲。 經(jīng)過(guò)這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)，他和同事對(duì)人際合作發(fā)展方式有了更深的理解。

　　Christakis博士在這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)中采用稱(chēng)為"公共利益"的游戲。 游戲之初，每個(gè)參與者分發(fā)到少量的分?jǐn)?shù)。 在接下來(lái)每一輪游戲中，參與者都有機(jī)會(huì)贈(zèng)送分?jǐn)?shù)給他的鄰居。 贈(zèng)送者的分?jǐn)?shù)能夠在游戲管理者那里得到與之舍出分?jǐn)?shù)相等量的增長(zhǎng)。 如果參與者都合作的話(huà)，每個(gè)人最終分?jǐn)?shù)都會(huì)比最開(kāi)始的多。 而拒絕贈(zèng)送分?jǐn)?shù)的"破壞者"卻從他鄰居們的損失中獲益。 為了保證適當(dāng)?shù)莫?jiǎng)勵(lì)到位，游戲后這些分?jǐn)?shù)可以變換成錢(qián)。

　　為了展開(kāi)這個(gè)大型的"公共利益"游戲，Christakis博士通過(guò)網(wǎng)上零售商亞馬遜提供的土耳其機(jī)器人網(wǎng)絡(luò)服務(wù)招收了785名志愿者。 這是個(gè)發(fā)包小任務(wù)給個(gè)體勞動(dòng)隊(duì)伍的服務(wù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)。 在這個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)上，每個(gè)志愿者大約和八個(gè)隨機(jī)分配的參與者連接組隊(duì)， 并根據(jù)三種設(shè)定的游戲模式重復(fù)開(kāi)展。 第一種模式，參與者總是和同一組人合作。 第二種模式，每一輪游戲后合作者都隨機(jī)重組。 最后一種，每一輪后，三分之一的組合將被選中并隨機(jī)重組 (因此這些重組的組合中可能有人在前面的游戲中已經(jīng)合作過(guò)了。)。 組合中一人會(huì)被告知或提醒他的合作對(duì)象在前面一輪游戲中的表現(xiàn)，他可以選擇是否解除和這個(gè)人的合作，如果他已經(jīng)有一個(gè)合作對(duì)象的話(huà); 如果他沒(méi)有合作對(duì)象，他則可以選擇是否建立新的合作聯(lián)系。

　　在所有三種模式中，大約60%的參與者最開(kāi)始都是遵守合作規(guī)則。 可是頭兩種模式中，隨著吃白食惡劣影響的擴(kuò)展，遵守的人數(shù)也跟著下降。 一個(gè)參與者合作過(guò)的對(duì)象中破壞規(guī)則的人數(shù)比例越高，這個(gè)參與者在下一輪的游戲中越不可能遵守合作規(guī)則-典型的"以牙還牙"。 然后，這種"以牙還牙"的報(bào)復(fù)并不能拯救合作的持續(xù)，在十幾輪游戲后，只有10-20%的參與者還愿意合作。 然而在參與者可以選擇合作對(duì)象的模式中，合作的人數(shù)隨著游戲的進(jìn)行保持穩(wěn)定。

　　Christakis博士和他的團(tuán)隊(duì)觀察第三種模式中參與者的關(guān)系如何演變時(shí)， 他們發(fā)現(xiàn)沒(méi)有碰到過(guò)破壞者的組合更容易保持合作。 在游戲中，合作者比破壞者積累了更多的合作關(guān)系。 而且，被拒絕后，破壞者也開(kāi)始改變他們的行為。 在前面一輪游戲中和他中止合作的人越多，他越有可能轉(zhuǎn)向合作者。 不像簡(jiǎn)單的以牙還牙，社會(huì)報(bào)復(fù)有一個(gè)標(biāo)記作用。

　　接下來(lái)的問(wèn)題是，這樣的一個(gè)機(jī)制在實(shí)驗(yàn)室外是否可行? 為了找出答案，Christakis博士已經(jīng)和一些人類(lèi)學(xué)家取得聯(lián)系。 他們希望能夠很快得出結(jié)論。

　　為幫助廣大考生更好地準(zhǔn)備雅思、托福、SAT等考試，澳際留學(xué)特推出【英語(yǔ)學(xué)習(xí)】頻道，涵蓋基礎(chǔ)英語(yǔ)、實(shí)用英語(yǔ)、娛樂(lè)英語(yǔ)等多項(xiàng)內(nèi)容，在您通往成功的道路上做您最堅(jiān)實(shí)的左膀右臂。

　　以下部分為【雙語(yǔ)閱讀】?jī)?nèi)容，本文介紹社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)馴服欺騙者，中文翻譯部分見(jiàn)第二頁(yè)。

　　Science and Technolgy

　　The evolution of co-operation

　　Make or break?

　　Social networking tames cheats

　　HOW people collaborate, in the face of numerous temptations to cheat, is an important field of psychological and economic research. A lot of this research focuses on the "tit-for-tat" theory of co-operation: that humans are disposed, when dealing with another person, to behave in a generous manner until that other person shows himself not to be generous. At this point co-operation is withdrawn. Fool me once, in other words, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. When he encounters such a withdrawal of collaboration, the theory goes, the malactor will learn the error of his ways and become a more co-operative individual.

　　And there is experimental evidence, based on specially designed games, that tit-for-tat does work for pairs of people. Human societies, though, are more complex than mere dyads. And until recently, it has been difficult to model that complexity in the laboratory. But a paper published this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by Nicholas Christakis and his colleagues at Harvard has changed that. Dr Christakis arranged for a collaboration-testing game to be played over the web, with many participants. As a result, he and his team have gained a more sophisticated insight into the way co-operation develops.

　　Dr Christakis used what is known as a public-goods game for his experiment. At the beginning of such a game, points are doled out to each participant. During every round, players are given the opportunity to donate points to their neighbours. Points so donated are augmented by an equal number from the masters of the game. If everyone co-operates, then, everyone ends up richer. A "dector" who ruses to donate to his co-operating neighbours will, however, benit at the expense of those neighbours. At the game&aposs end, the points are converted into real money, to ensure that proper incentives are in place.

　　To play his large-scale public-goods game, Dr Christakis recruited 785 volunteers via Mechanical Turk—a service provided by Amazon, an online retailer, that works by farming out small tasks to an army of individual workers. Each volunteer was randomly assigned links to, on average, eight other players. Together, they played repeated rounds of one of three variations of the game. In the first, participants always interacted with the same group of people. In the second, the connections were randomly reshuffled after each round. In the final version, one-third of the possible pairings between participants were chosen at random after each round (such pairs may or may not, therore, have been dealing with each other in the previous round). One player from each pair was first told or reminded of how the other had behaved in the previous round, and was then asked whether he wanted to break his connection with that player, if he already had one, or form a new connection, if he had not.

　　In all versions of the game, roughly 60% of players started out co-operating. However, in the first two, this decreased over time as the pernicious influence of the freeloaders spread. The larger the fraction of a subject&aposs partners who dected in a given round, the less likely that person was to co-operate in the next—classical tit-for-tat. However, this tit-for-tat retaliation was not enough to save co-operation, and after a dozen rounds only 10-20% of the players were still willing to co-operate. In the variant where participants had some choice over whom they interacted with, though, the amount of co-operation stayed stable as the rounds progressed.

　　When Dr Christakis and his team looked at how the relationships between players were evolving in this third version, they found that connections between two co-operators were much more likely to be maintained than links that involved a dector. Over time, the co-operators accumulated more social connections than the dectors did. Furthermore, as they were shunned, the dectors began to change their behaviour. A dector&aposs likelihood of switching to co-operation increased with the number of players who had broken links with him in the previous round. Unlike straightforward tit-for-tat, social retaliation was having a marked fect.

　　The next question, then, is whether such a mechanism holds outside the laboratory. To find out, Dr Christakis has forged links with some anthropologists. They hope to report the answer soon.

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