【雙語閱讀】Fatalism v fetishism宿命論VS進(jìn)口至上說.

　　Economics focus

　　Fatalism v fetishism

　　Jun 11th 2009

　　From The Economist print edition

　　How will developing countries grow after the financial crisis?

　　FORTY years ago Singapore, now home to the world’s busiest port, was a forlorn outpost still garrisoned by the British. In 1961 South Korea was less industrialised than the communist north and dependent on American aid. In 1978 China’s exports amounted to less than 5% of its GDP. These countries, and many of their neighbours, have since traded their way out of poverty. Given their success, it is easy to forget that some development economists were once prey to “export fatalism”. Poor countries, they believed, had little to gain from venturing into the world market. If they tried to expand their exports, they would thwart each other, driving down the price of their commodities.

　　The financial crisis of the past nine months is stirring a new export fatalism in the minds of some economists. Even after the global economy recovers, developing countries may find it harder to pursue a policy of “export-led growth”, which served countries like South Korea so well. Under this strategy, sometimes called “export fetishism”, countries spur sales abroad, often by keeping their currencies cheap. Some save the proceeds in foreign-currency reserves, rather than spending them on imports. This strategy is one reason why the developing world’s current-account surplus exceeded $700 billion in 2008, as measured by the IMF. In the past, these surpluses were offset by American dicits. But America may now rethink the bargain. This imbalance, whereby foreigners sell their goods to America in exchange for its assets, was one potential cause of the country’s financial crisis.

　　If this global bargain does come unstuck, how should developing countries respond? In a new paper*, Dani Rodrik of Harvard University offers a novel suggestion. He argues that developing countries should continue to promote exportables, but no longer promote exports. What’s the difference? An exportable is a good that could be traded across borders, but need not be. Mr Rodrik’s recommended policies would help countries make more of these exportables, without selling quite so many abroad.

　　Countries grow by shifting labour and investment from traditional activities, where productivity is stagnant, to new industries, which abound in economies of scale or opportunities to assimilate better techniques. These new industries usually make exportable goods, such as cotton textiles or toys. But whatever the fetishists believe, there is nothing special about the act of exporting per se, Mr Rodrik argues. For example, companies do not need to venture abroad to feel the bracing sting of international competition. If their products can be traded across borders, then foreign rivals can compete with them at home.

　　As countries industrialise and diversify, their exports grow, which sometimes results in a trade surplus. These three things tend to go together. But in a statistical “horse race” between the three—industrialisation, exports and exports minus imports—Mr Rodrik finds that it is the growth of tradable, industrial goods, as a share of GDP, that does most of the work.

　　How do you promote exportables without promoting exports? Cheap currencies will not do the trick. They serve as a subsidy to exports, but also act like a tax on imports. They encourage the production of tradable goods, but discourage their consumption—which is why producers look for buyers abroad.

　　Policymakers need a different set of tools, Mr Rodrik argues. They should set aside their exchange-rate policies in favour of industrial policy, subsidising promising new industries directly. These sops would expand the production of tradable goods above what the market would dictate. But the subsidy would not discourage their consumption. Indeed, policymakers should allow the country’s exchange rate to strengthen naturally, eliminating any trade surplus. The stronger currency would cost favoured industries some foreign customers. But these firms would still do better overall than under a policy of laissez-faire.

　　Return of the cargo cult

　　Mr Rodrik offers a solution to an awkward problem: how policymakers can restore the growth strategies of the pre-crisis era without reviving the trade imbalances that accompanied them. But is his solution as neat as it sounds? Start with the theory. Mr Rodrik claims there is nothing special about exporting. He is probably right. But his statistical test is unlikely to be the last word on the matter, given the difficulties of disentangling variables that move together. Mr Rodrik’s model also assumes a single tradable good. Under his policies, countries sell the same kind of stuff at home that they formerly sold to foreigners. In a more elaborate model, foreign and local tastes would differ. China, for example, made most of the world’s third-generation mobile phones long bore 3G telephony was available at home. Firms in poor countries can learn a lot from serving richer customers abroad.

　　What about the practice? Subsidies are notoriously prone to error and abuse. Even bore the crisis, Mr Rodrik was keen to rehabilitate industrial policy in the eyes of many economists, who doubt governments’ ability to pick winners but have every faith in their aptitude for favouring corporate friends. In these circles, a cheap currency is often seen as the least disreputable form of industrial policy, because it benits exporters in general, without favouring any particular industry or firm.

　　This ingenious economist may also be preparing for a future that is further off than you might think. American policymakers are certainly worried about their country’s trade dicit. But they are far more concerned about unemployment. Most of their forts to revive demand will tend to widen the trade gap, at least in the short run. The American government is also more anxious than ever to sell its paper, and whatever they say in public, the central banks of China and other big emerging economies still seem happy to buy. Export fetishism seems fated to endure.

　　【中文翻譯對照】

　　經(jīng)濟(jì)聚焦

　　宿命論 VS 進(jìn)口至上說

　　2009年6月11日

　　摘自《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》雜志

　　金融危機(jī)后發(fā)展中國家將如何成長?

　　現(xiàn)今世界最繁忙的港口坐落于新加坡——在40年前它還只是英國人駐軍的遙遠(yuǎn)哨所。1961年的南朝鮮靠美國援助度日，在產(chǎn)業(yè)化的路上遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于他們北面的社會主義鄰居。1987年的中國出口額占GDP總量不到5%。之后，這些國家和他們的鄰居們靠開放商路脫離了貧窮。在這些國家成功的光環(huán)下，過去許多發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家深受“出口宿命說”(注一)折磨的往事被淡忘了。他們曾經(jīng)相信，窮國投身全球市場并無利可圖。一旦他們試圖擴(kuò)大出口，那么窮國之間便會互相傷害并造成他們出產(chǎn)的商品價(jià)格下降。

　　過去九個月里的金融危機(jī)在某些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的腦海里攪起了新的出口宿命論。就算是在金融危機(jī)過后，也許發(fā)展中國家也可能會覺得他們要想采用那種使南朝鮮一類的國家受益頗多的“出口帶動型增長”政策變得更加困難了。在這種被稱為“出口至上主義”的策略下，政府常以保持本國貨幣的廉價(jià)來激勵跨國貿(mào)易。一些國家選擇把出口收益存入外匯儲備，而不是用它們來進(jìn)口。國際貨幣基金組織統(tǒng)計(jì)出，2008年發(fā)展中國家的經(jīng)常賬戶(注二)有7千億美元的結(jié)余，這(出口至上主義的策略)也許就是原因之一。在過去，這些結(jié)余會被美國的貿(mào)易逆差抵消。但是美國現(xiàn)在可能要重新考慮一下這筆交易了。外國人通過此類失衡來出售貨物給美國人以換取美國資產(chǎn)，這也是美國金融危機(jī)的潛在原因之一。

　　若這種全球交易確實(shí)還可行，發(fā)展中國家該如何應(yīng)對?哈弗大學(xué)的Dani Rodrik(注三)在他的新論文中提供了一個新穎的建議。他認(rèn)為發(fā)展中國家應(yīng)該繼續(xù)鼓勵“可出口”，但不要促進(jìn)“出口”。這兩者的差異是什么呢?“可出口”指那些可以但不必出口的貨物。Mr Rodrik所推薦的政策會幫助發(fā)展中國家生產(chǎn)更多的“可出口”貨物同時避免將它們大量售往國外。

　　在后金融危機(jī)時代，決策者該如何在保留利于增長的策略同時又避免隨之而來的貿(mào)易失衡呢?Mr Rodrik提供了他對這個令人尷尬的問題的解決辦法。但是他的辦法和聽上去的一樣有效嗎? Mr Rodrik以"貿(mào)易沒什么大不了的"作為他理論的開始。這可能沒錯。但當(dāng)遇到無法理清同時變化的諸多變量這類困難時，他的統(tǒng)計(jì)實(shí)驗(yàn)不可能給這個問題蓋棺論定。同時，Mr Rodrik的模型只假設(shè)了單一“可出口”貨物。在他的政策下，所有國家都在本國出售同一種他們之前賣到國外的商品。在更精確的模型下，國外與國內(nèi)的偏好應(yīng)該不同。舉例來說，遠(yuǎn)在3G電話可以使用前，中國國內(nèi)就已經(jīng)制造了世界上最多的第三代移動電話。窮國的企業(yè)可以在取悅富國的消費(fèi)者的過程中學(xué)到許多。

　　當(dāng)生產(chǎn)力停滯后，國家通過從傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動中轉(zhuǎn)移勞力和投資到新興產(chǎn)業(yè)里來成長，這些新產(chǎn)業(yè)大量存在于規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)或是那些吸納了更先進(jìn)技術(shù)的商機(jī)中。這類新產(chǎn)業(yè)往往制造的是“可出口”貨物，像是棉織物或玩具。但是Mr Rodrik也談到，無論貿(mào)易至上主義者怎么想，出口本身并無異處。舉例來說，公司并不一定要冒險(xiǎn)開展國外業(yè)務(wù)來受國際競爭的刺激。一旦他們的貨品被出口，那么國外競爭者便將可以在本國土地上展開反擊。

　　伴隨著國家產(chǎn)業(yè)化和產(chǎn)品多樣化進(jìn)程的是出口增加，這有時會帶來貿(mào)易過剩。這三種狀況相伴相生。但在產(chǎn)業(yè)化，出口和凈出口的數(shù)據(jù)化對比中，Mr Rodrik 發(fā)現(xiàn)，作為GDP的一部分，是“可交易”的產(chǎn)業(yè)產(chǎn)品起了主要作用。

　　那如何來刺激“可出口”同時避免促進(jìn)出口呢?廉價(jià)貨幣辦不到。它們削減出口，但同時又像增收進(jìn)口關(guān)稅。他們促進(jìn)“可出口”貨物的生產(chǎn)同時又抑止它們被消費(fèi)，這就是為什么生產(chǎn)者會尋求外國買家的原因。

　　Mr Rodrik認(rèn)為決策者需要另一套不同的工具。他們應(yīng)該以產(chǎn)業(yè)政策取代匯率政策并直接向有澳際的新產(chǎn)業(yè)補(bǔ)助。這些操作可以在市場確定數(shù)額的基礎(chǔ)上拓展“可交易”貨物的生產(chǎn)。但是這些補(bǔ)助金又不會影響“可出口”貨物的銷售。事實(shí)上，決策者應(yīng)該允許他們國家的匯率自由上浮，以消除貿(mào)易過量。更強(qiáng)的貨幣將會抑止外國資金流入過熱部門。但就算這樣，這些企業(yè)也會比在自由放任政策下來得更好。

　　貨物崇拜歸來

　　那實(shí)踐方面又如何呢?補(bǔ)助金有著臭名昭著的傾向，那就是易于發(fā)放出錯和被濫用。甚至在金融危機(jī)前，Mr Rodrik在許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的眼里就是一個執(zhí)著于整頓產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的人，這些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家懷疑政府是否能在挑選受助者的同時不濫用這種可以惠及盟友的能力。在這些圈子中，由于廉價(jià)貨幣一般來說會有利于出口者而對特定產(chǎn)業(yè)和企業(yè)沒有好處，這種政策是最為聲名狼藉。

　　這位天才的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家可能是在為一個你無法想象的未來做著準(zhǔn)備。美國的決策者確實(shí)很擔(dān)心他們國家的貿(mào)易逆差。但失業(yè)率更讓他們操心。至少在短期，他們的大部分拉動需求的努力都將會擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易壁壘。同時美國政府正前所未有地?zé)崆信瓮軌蚴鄢鏊麄兯^“中國央行和其他新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體依然十分情愿購買”的債券。似乎出口至上主義者命中注定得等等了。

　　注一：關(guān)于進(jìn)口宿命說，可參看Speech by Hon&aposble Thiru Murasoli Maran, Union Commerce&IndustryMinister

　　注二：　經(jīng)常賬戶(Current Account，或譯為“經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目”)，是經(jīng)常發(fā)生的國際經(jīng)濟(jì)交易，是最基本、最重要的賬戶。包括貨物、服務(wù)、收入和經(jīng)常轉(zhuǎn)移四個項(xiàng)目。

　　經(jīng)常賬戶(即“經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目”)，和資本與金融賬戶相對，指在國際收支平衡表中貿(mào)易和服務(wù)而產(chǎn)生的資金流動。這一部分所以被看成是一種更加合理的資金流動。

　　國際收支中的經(jīng)常賬戶是指貿(mào)易收支的總和(商品和服務(wù)的出口減去進(jìn)口)，減去生產(chǎn)要素收入(例如利息和股息)，然后減去轉(zhuǎn)移支付(例如外國援助)。經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目順差(盈余)增加了一個國家相應(yīng)金額的外國資本凈額;經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目逆差(赤字)則恰好相反。

　　貿(mào)易收支是經(jīng)常賬戶下典型的最重要的部分。也就是說貿(mào)易狀況的變化是經(jīng)常賬戶的主要影響因素。然而，對于那些少數(shù)的擁有大量海外資產(chǎn)和負(fù)債的國家，生產(chǎn)要素支付凈額可能作用顯著。

　　經(jīng)常賬戶，資本賬戶，金融賬戶以及官方儲備的變化一起，總和為零構(gòu)成賬戶的定義。這個總和被稱為國際收支。通常來說，官方儲備的變化非常小。

　　Economics focus

　　Fatalism v fetishism

　　Jun 11th 2009

　　From The Economist print edition

　　How will developing countries grow after the financial crisis?

　　FORTY years ago Singapore, now home to the world’s busiest port, was a forlorn outpost still garrisoned by the British. In 1961 South Korea was less industrialised than the communist north and dependent on American aid. In 1978 China’s exports amounted to less than 5% of its GDP. These countries, and many of their neighbours, have since traded their way out of poverty. Given their success, it is easy to forget that some development economists were once prey to “export fatalism”. Poor countries, they believed, had little to gain from venturing into the world market. If they tried to expand their exports, they would thwart each other, driving down the price of their commodities.

　　The financial crisis of the past nine months is stirring a new export fatalism in the minds of some economists. Even after the global economy recovers, developing countries may find it harder to pursue a policy of “export-led growth”, which served countries like South Korea so well. Under this strategy, sometimes called “export fetishism”, countries spur sales abroad, often by keeping their currencies cheap. Some save the proceeds in foreign-currency reserves, rather than spending them on imports. This strategy is one reason why the developing world’s current-account surplus exceeded $700 billion in 2008, as measured by the IMF. In the past, these surpluses were offset by American dicits. But America may now rethink the bargain. This imbalance, whereby foreigners sell their goods to America in exchange for its assets, was one potential cause of the country’s financial crisis.

　　If this global bargain does come unstuck, how should developing countries respond? In a new paper*, Dani Rodrik of Harvard University offers a novel suggestion. He argues that developing countries should continue to promote exportables, but no longer promote exports. What’s the difference? An exportable is a good that could be traded across borders, but need not be. Mr Rodrik’s recommended policies would help countries make more of these exportables, without selling quite so many abroad.

　　Countries grow by shifting labour and investment from traditional activities, where productivity is stagnant, to new industries, which abound in economies of scale or opportunities to assimilate better techniques. These new industries usually make exportable goods, such as cotton textiles or toys. But whatever the fetishists believe, there is nothing special about the act of exporting per se, Mr Rodrik argues. For example, companies do not need to venture abroad to feel the bracing sting of international competition. If their products can be traded across borders, then foreign rivals can compete with them at home.

　　As countries industrialise and diversify, their exports grow, which sometimes results in a trade surplus. These three things tend to go together. But in a statistical “horse race” between the three—industrialisation, exports and exports minus imports—Mr Rodrik finds that it is the growth of tradable, industrial goods, as a share of GDP, that does most of the work.

　　How do you promote exportables without promoting exports? Cheap currencies will not do the trick. They serve as a subsidy to exports, but also act like a tax on imports. They encourage the production of tradable goods, but discourage their consumption—which is why producers look for buyers abroad.

　　Policymakers need a different set of tools, Mr Rodrik argues. They should set aside their exchange-rate policies in favour of industrial policy, subsidising promising new industries directly. These sops would expand the production of tradable goods above what the market would dictate. But the subsidy would not discourage their consumption. Indeed, policymakers should allow the country’s exchange rate to strengthen naturally, eliminating any trade surplus. The stronger currency would cost favoured industries some foreign customers. But these firms would still do better overall than under a policy of laissez-faire.

　　Return of the cargo cult

　　Mr Rodrik offers a solution to an awkward problem: how policymakers can restore the growth strategies of the pre-crisis era without reviving the trade imbalances that accompanied them. But is his solution as neat as it sounds? Start with the theory. Mr Rodrik claims there is nothing special about exporting. He is probably right. But his statistical test is unlikely to be the last word on the matter, given the difficulties of disentangling variables that move together. Mr Rodrik’s model also assumes a single tradable good. Under his policies, countries sell the same kind of stuff at home that they formerly sold to foreigners. In a more elaborate model, foreign and local tastes would differ. China, for example, made most of the world’s third-generation mobile phones long bore 3G telephony was available at home. Firms in poor countries can learn a lot from serving richer customers abroad.

　　What about the practice? Subsidies are notoriously prone to error and abuse. Even bore the crisis, Mr Rodrik was keen to rehabilitate industrial policy in the eyes of many economists, who doubt governments’ ability to pick winners but have every faith in their aptitude for favouring corporate friends. In these circles, a cheap currency is often seen as the least disreputable form of industrial policy, because it benits exporters in general, without favouring any particular industry or firm.

　　This ingenious economist may also be preparing for a future that is further off than you might think. American policymakers are certainly worried about their country’s trade dicit. But they are far more concerned about unemployment. Most of their forts to revive demand will tend to widen the trade gap, at least in the short run. The American government is also more anxious than ever to sell its paper, and whatever they say in public, the central banks of China and other big emerging economies still seem happy to buy. Export fetishism seems fated to endure.

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